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Making sense of violence ?
Reflections on the history
of interpersonal violence in Europe
Richard Mc Mahon, Joachim Eibach and Randolph Roth1
Over the last thirty years, historians of crime and criminal justice have taken a keen interest in the extent and nature of interpersonal violence in medieval, 
early modern and modern Europe. Drawing inspiration from Ted Robert  Gurr’s 
ground-breaking study of long-term homicide rates from the late middle ages to the 
latter half of the twentieth century2, historians have sought to map and explain long-
term patterns in lethal interpersonal violence and, in particular, the reasons behind 
the seeming decline in homicide rates in many areas of Europe over time.
For some, the apparent decline in homicide rates reflects  considerable and 
perhaps even fundamental change in  cultural attitudes towards violent activity. 
Many have understood change in the  context of a wider civilising process. 
Indeed, Norbert  Elias’s civilising process thesis has been the most prominent and 
 controversial interpretative framework for explaining the apparent changes in 
patterns of homicidal violence. Pieter Spierenburg, drawing on Elias, argues, for 
instance, that patterns of violence have been profoundly altered not only by greater 
state intervention and broad changes in European socio-economic life but also by 
increased levels of ‘affect  control’ which trickled down from the social elite to 
the masses over several centuries. In this view, as the state became more active 
in prosecuting violence through the courts, as interdependence among individuals 
increased with the development of new economic relationships, and as new ideas 
 concerning appropriate behaviour spread from the elite, individuals became less 
likely to resort to violence to resolve  conflicts.3 Steven Pinker, using a dazzling 
array of statistical evidence and a broad range of case studies, also draws on the 
 concept of a civilising process to argue that the apparent decline in violence is a  chief 
benefit and  consequence of the impact of modernity on the western world. He credits 
especially the influence of Enlightenment thought since the eighteenth century. 
For Pinker, the “erosion of family, tribe, tradition, and religion” by the “forces of 
1 The idea for this collection of essays was hatched in a cabin room of the Queen Mary at the SSHA 
 conference in Long Beach, California in 2009. It was further developed at the  conference ‘Making 
Sense of Violence ? Interdisciplinary Approaches to Violence : Past and Present’ that we organized in 
Bern, Switzerland, in September 2011. We benefited greatly from the perspectives and ideas offered 
by all those who  contributed to that  conference. We are also particularly grateful to the Gerda Henkel 
Foundation, the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, the Johanna Dürmüller-Bol Foundation and the MVUB of the University of Bern for their 
kind sponsorship of the  conference.
2 Gurr (1982).  Gurr’s article sparked off  considerable debate within the English historiography. See, 
for instance, Stone (1983) ; Sharpe (1985).
3 See Elias (1939) revised ed. (2000) ; Spierenburg (1994, 1996, 1998). 
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individualism, cosmopolitanism, reason, and science” contributed to the decline in 
rates of interpersonal violence in western societies.4
Others have been somewhat more moderate in their claims. A number of 
historians, particularly those working on early modern Britain and Germany, have 
understood the alterations in patterns of violent activity as a  consequence of changes 
in perceptions of male honour and the rise of individualism. They argue that, as 
 community influence waned in the early modern period and new norms surrounding 
individual behaviour emerged, violence, over the course of the eighteenth century in 
particular, became less central to individual male identity and came increasingly to 
be the preserve of often marginalised sections of the lower orders.5 Some have also 
been highly critical of the civilizing process thesis and, in particular, have queried the 
reliability of the medieval homicide figures – preferring instead to base their analysis 
on the more reliable data from the early modern period.6 Greater state intervention 
and a wider process of social disciplining, often driven by church bodies, new work 
practices, and the expansion in the number of schools have also been credited with 
 contributing to a diminution in violent activity among individuals.7
Others have adopted an even more sceptical approach to the evidence and 
have been suspicious of applying over-arching theories of socio- cultural change 
to explain the decline in homicide rates – preferring instead to emphasize changes 
in medical expertise and practice, in the age structure of the population and also 
the difficulties inherent in the use of the available sources.8 Outside of a directly 
European  context (but with clear implications for it) Randolph Roth has also 
proposed an alternative framework for understanding variations in homicide rates 
over time which emphasizes the importance of trust in state institutions and, more 
broadly, the process of nation building in establishing low levels of interpersonal 
violence.9 In doing so, Roth is wary of any tendency to draw a “sharp line between 
pre-modern and modern states and personalities”.10
The essays in this special edition trace the ebb and flow of violence within 
specific  contexts without succumbing to the temptations of either a too narrow view 
or too broad a brushstroke. In doing so, they are generally critical of those who view 
changes in patterns of violent activity in Europe in the light of a wider civilising 
process and offer different approaches to the analysis of  continuity and change in 
 4 For Pinker, the rise of the state, the development of webs of  commerce, feminization, cosmopolitan-
ism and an increasing resort to reason as a means of resolving  conflict, have all  contributed to the 
decline in interpersonal violence. Pinker (2011). Pinker and others, most notably John Carter Wood 
and Gregory Hanlon, have also looked to evolutionary psychology to provide a broad cross- cultural 
framework within which the history of interpersonal violence can be understood. Although we think 
this perspective is important and needs to be engaged with by historians of violence, unfortunately, 
reasons of space prevent us from discussing these issues here. See Pinker (2011) ; Carter Wood (2007, 
2011) ; Hanlon (2013).
 5 Shoemaker (2001, 2002) ; Eibach (2003, 2008).
 6 See Schwerhoff (1998, 2004). For the debate between Spierenburg and Schwerhoff on the relative 
merits of their positions, see Spierenburg, (2001) ; Schwerhoff, (2002) ; Spierenburg (2002). For a 
good overview of the differing interpretations of the history of interpersonal violence in Europe, see 
Eisner (2001, 2003).
 7 Eisner (2001).
 8 See, for instance, Cockburn (1991) ; Carroll (2007).
 9 Roth (2009). See also Spierenburg (2011a, 2011b) ; Roth (2011).
10 Roth (2009).
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the history of interpersonal violence. Gerd Schwerhoff offers a critical overview of 
changes in patterns of violence in early modern Europe – with a particular focus on 
how changes in violent behaviour in German-speaking countries reflected wider shifts 
in economic, social and  cultural life. Through a study of the German historiography, 
he provides a thorough and  compelling critique of those scholars who view changes 
in interpersonal violence in the light of a broader civilising process. John Cronin 
provides an excellent micro-study of elite violence in action by exploring the role of 
the duel in the banished Caroline Stuart court in the mid-seventeenth century. He too 
is sceptical about the applicability of Elias in understanding patterns of elite violence 
in the early modern period.
Manon van der Heijden explores patterns of violence among men and women 
in early modern Holland and, through the innovative use of legal records, draws 
attention to the prominence of women among the perpetrators of violence as 
well as the support in place for women within early modern neighbourhoods in 
Holland. In doing so, she skilfully raises key questions about the prevailing view 
of the relationship between women and violent activity and draws attention to 
 considerable  continuities in behaviour over time. In the final essay, Maurice Cottier 
and Silvio Raciti provide a penetrating analysis of the relationship between changes 
in patterns of violence and wider social and  cultural change in Swiss cities and, in 
the process, provide a fresh and stimulating account of shifting practices in the use of 
interpersonal violence. In particular, they note a marked shift, in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, away from the practice of sociable violence and the 
emergence of a new form of ‘fatalistic’ violence.
This introductory essay draws on the insights of these articles but also 
reflects, more broadly, on the history of interpersonal violence in Europe and, in 
doing so, engages with three key issues which emerge from and are central to the 
historiography : What is the extent of interpersonal violence in Europe since the late 
middle ages ? What is the character and nature of such violence ? Has interpersonal 
violence moved from the centre to the margins of European life ? In addressing 
these three key questions, the introduction will also offer a critique of the dominant 
interpretations of the history of interpersonal violence in European life.
THE EXTENT OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
The dominant view within the historiography is that rates of interpersonal 
violence have decreased markedly in Europe over the last seven centuries. The 
evidence for this is (at least superficially)  compelling. It is possible to point, for 
instance, to estimated rates of 110 homicides per 100,000 in fourteenth-century 
Oxford and Florence – rates which far exceed anything found in modern-day Europe. 
While these rates are exceptional even for the period, evidence from elsewhere in 
Europe suggests that rates were often in excess of anything found in the present – 
with estimated rates of circa 20 to 40 homicides per 100,000 of the population found 
for a number of areas in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.11 Following this 
highpoint, there appears to be a fall in homicide rates in the early modern period 
and certainly by the eighteenth century, when homicide rates fall below – often 
11 Spierenburg (2008, pp. 15-16) ; Eisner (2001, p. 628).
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well below – 10 per 100,000 in many areas of Europe. By the nineteenth century, 
homicide rates in most areas of Europe were rarely in double figures and, according 
to Eisner, the European average for the nineteenth century was 2.6 per 100,000.12 
Homicide rates reached an all-time low by the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, in 
some countries, there was a risk that homicide would disappear altogether from the 
national landscape. The rate in the Republic of Ireland in the 1950s was 0.23 per 
100,00013 – amongst the lowest national homicide rates in recorded human history. 
Since the 1960s, there has been an increase in rates in many parts of Europe, but it 
has not  come anywhere near the levels recorded for the late medieval period.
This apparent shift in the extent of interpersonal violence has been central to the 
civilising process thesis advocated by Spierenburg and others who have argued that 
changes in homicide rates reflect a wider transformation in the economic, social and 
 cultural life of Europe. There are, however, serious problems with this analysis. To 
begin, the high homicide rates for medieval Europe probably exaggerate the extent of 
lethal violence relative to later periods. There is a very real possibility, for instance, 
that the medieval samples include homicide cases that occurred outside the cities but 
which were dealt with by the authorities in the cities. This would mean that there 
is a definite imbalance between the estimated homicide figures and the estimated 
population figures.14 The lack of reliable population figures is also a serious problem 
for anyone attempting to calculate accurate homicide rates with evidence that, in some 
cases at least, urban population figures have been significantly underestimated.15
Historians of homicide are also not always  comparing like with like when they 
 compare homicide rates from the middle ages with those of later periods. In an 
English  context, as Roth has highlighted, the homicide rates from the early modern 
period are often derived from the number of indictments for homicide while those for 
the middle ages are generated from coroners’ rolls. Indictments depend on the ability 
of the authorities to bring cases before the courts and are therefore less  complete 
as sources for homicides than the more  comprehensive coroners’ inquests which 
capture cases at an earlier stage of the criminal process. This would suggest that any 
simple narrative of decline is problematic. The available evidence rather indicates 
that rates fluctuated  considerably between the late middle ages and the early modern 
period with marked increases in the second half of the fourteenth and the late 
sixteenth centuries.16 There is then no obvious or  consistent pattern of decline. There 
is also a difficulty for those who support the civilising process thesis in drawing on 
evidence from the fourteenth century without offering due attention to rates from the 
thirteenth century which indicate that rates at that time were actually lower than a 
century later.17 The use of the fourteenth century as a point of  comparison can then 
serve to distort the difference between the middle ages and the early modern period.
12 Eisner (2003, p. 99).
13  O’Donnell (2005, p. 677).
14 Schwerhoff (2002, p. 5). See also Lindström (2008, p. 50).
15 Lindström (2008, p. 49).
16 Roth (2001).
17 Sharpe, while questioning the validity of many of the homicide rates derived from medieval and early 
modern sources, points out that rates in Oxford in the 1340s were twenty-seven times those in Bristol 
in the previous century. He attributes this to differences in the source material rather than any shift in 
practice. See Sharpe (1985, p. 209).
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The evidence of a decline between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries 
is more  compelling. There is, for instance, almost universal agreement that a 
substantial decline in homicide rates occurred in many areas of Europe during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.18 We need, however, to be careful here also 
as the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century was a time of particularly high 
rates in many regions. This again distorts the difference between the eighteenth 
and earlier centuries. The difference in rates between the late sixteenth century and 
the eighteenth century in England is, for instance, much greater than the difference 
between the early sixteenth century and the eighteenth century. This again suggests 
any broad narrative of decline driven by a wider civilising process is at least open 
to question.19
Comparisons between earlier periods and the present day are also problematic. 
This is particularly so, if we  consider the impact of improvements in medical care. 
Recent estimates suggest that circa 50 per cent of victims in the late nineteenth 
century would have survived if they had access to the benefits of modern medical 
care and emergency services.20 Improved nutrition and health must also be taken into 
account. It may simply be that healthier individuals in the present day are better able 
to survive violent assaults. It might also be interesting to assess the degree to which 
this applies when  comparing different societies in, say, the nineteenth century. Might, 
for instance, individuals in societies that experienced major episodes of famine such 
as Ireland, Belgium and Finland be more likely to die following violent attacks than 
those in countries spared the ravages of widespread food shortages ? Remarkably 
there has, as yet, been no attempt to establish a correlation between homicide rates 
and broader trends in mortality and health over time and space.
The impact of medical care and nutrition on homicide rates also has implications 
for the civilising process thesis. High homicide rates, Spierenburg argues, are usually 
due to the prevalence of male-on-male fighting and the declining proportion of such 
cases over time must, he argues, be due to changes in the ‘affect  control’ of individuals. 
Such male on male fighting must, however, be far less likely to lead to homicide in 
the present day due to medical intervention and improved nutrition. There are three 
reasons for this (1) these cases are often, in  Spierenburg’s words, ‘accidents’ ; thus 
there is a lack of intent to kill in the first instance ; (2) the protagonists are less likely 
to have pre-planned the attack and are, therefore, less likely to bring weapons to the 
scene ; and (3) they are more likely than, for instance, cases of domestic violence to 
involve protagonists of similar strength. It is likely, therefore, that improvements in 
medical care would have a particular impact on the extent of homicides arising from 
male-on-male fighting relative to other forms of homicide.
If we allow for improvements in medical care, the impact of emergency services 
and improved nutrition, and take account as well of the need to revise the population 
estimates, especially when cases from outside city boundaries are  considered, we 
18 Eisner (2001) ; Schwerhoff (2011, p. 119).
19 Roth (2001). This decline was also, as is generally acknowledged by scholars, subject to periodic 
reversals. In Frankfurt on Main, for instance, the homicide rate rose from 7.5 per 100,000 in the 
early years of the eighteenth century to 11 per 100,000 by the 1740s and fell substantially to 2.8 per 
100,000 in the early 1780s. See Eibach (2003, p. 103). This mid-eighteenth century rise in lethal vio-
lence was by no means unique to Frankfurt on Main and has yet to be fully explored and explained 
by historians.
20 Eckberg (2010).
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could reasonably argue that medieval homicide rates need to be reduced significantly 
before they are  compared to rates in the present day. If we were to simply allow for 
improvements in medical care and emergency services, present-day rates could be 
very similar to rates in the eighteenth century with little substantial change over 
time in many areas. In some cases the rates for the eighteenth century would be 
lower than those for the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Rates for the 
fourteenth century would still be higher than the European average of between 1 and 
2 per 100,000 today but even here we need to be careful. First, rates calculated for 
the thirteenth century would be much closer to those in the present – again raising 
questions about any fundamental decline in experiences of interpersonal violence. 
Second, and perhaps most crucially, questions can also be asked about the use of 
homicide rates as an indicator of the extent of non-lethal interpersonal violence. 
Central to the civilising process thesis is the claim that homicide rates can be seen 
as indicators of the wider prevalence of violence in a society. Spierenburg, in fact, 
argues that there is a clear relationship between lethal and non-lethal violence. He 
even develops a means to calculate the  connection. He argues that if we want to 
‘prove’ that there is a “doubling of  men’s aggressive impulses over a certain period”, 
we would need to quadruple the homicide rate to support our claims.21 This kind of 
calculation, although ostensibly reasonable, is based more on assumptions rather 
than on evidence of the relationship between lethal and non-lethal violence.
We need to at least entertain the idea that it is possible for there to be a difference 
in homicide rates between different societies and/or periods without this necessarily 
reflecting a fundamental difference in the extent of non-lethal violence. To take 
but one example, the rate of spousal homicide in Ireland in the 1990s was close to 
four times the rate in the 1960s.22 If we applied  Spierenburg’s model to our figures 
for Irish spousal homicide, it would mean that between the 1960s and the 1990s 
men and women in Ireland were nearly twice as likely to resort to violence towards 
their partners over the space of thirty years (through either an increasing number of 
people resorting to violence or some resorting to domestic violence on a more regular 
basis). While this is possible, it is open to question. Given the increased awareness 
of the problem of domestic violence in Ireland in recent decades and the greater 
supports in place for women (and, to a lesser extent, men) to  combat or at least evade 
domestic abuse, it would be surprising if this coincided with an upsurge in the use of 
non-lethal violence against partners. A more likely explanation is that the increased 
rate of spousal homicide reflects a greater severity in the use of violence as men, in 
particular, feel their position is increasingly threatened within the home. In this case, 
the use of the rate of spousal homicide as a broad indicator of the extent of non-
lethal spousal violence is flawed. It suggests rather that homicide rates offer a sense 
of the severity of violence and reveal the degree to which violence is  contained and 
 controlled rather than its extent. Nor, as will be argued below, should homicide rates 
be taken as a simple index of levels of ‘affect  control’.
Arguments for a fundamental change in the extent of interpersonal violence over 
time are flawed. This is due to problems with the available sources, the need to 
recognise the impact of improvements in medical care and nutrition, and doubts over 
21 Spierenburg (2001, p. 92).
22 Rates for the 1960s were estimated using the annual published reports of An Garda Síochána. The 
rates from the 1990s were derived from Dooley (2001).
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the degree to which rates of homicide might reflect the extent of non-lethal violence. 
Thus, while there are changes over time, these cannot be accounted for by a wider 
civilising process or any fundamental transformation in the extent of ‘affect  control’ 
among the general population. This  conclusion is further reinforced if we look to the 
character of violence in Europe since the late medieval period.
THE CHARACTER OF VIOLENCE
The dominant view within the historiography is that honour was central to life 
in early modern Europe and to the practice of violence. The general histories of 
violence by Spierenburg and Robert Muchembled emphasize the degree to which 
the character and practice of violence was bound up with and expressed through 
prevailing  concepts of honour. Honour was a valuable  commodity in need of 
protection : when under threat it could be defended by force.23 The essays in this 
collection  confirm the centrality of honour in the practice of violence in early modern 
Europe. Schwerhoff, reflecting a broader view in the German historiography, argues 
that  conceptions of personal honour, albeit in varied forms, were at the heart of 
most acts of violence in the early modern period. Cronin too notes the centrality 
of  concepts of honour in elite  culture and how violence might be used to uphold 
and defend status among elites in the seventeenth century. This is certainly evident 
in the operation of the exiled court of Charles II, and it is possible to find similar 
examples in other royal courts in early modern Europe.24 Cottier and Raciti also note 
the prevalence of violence as a means of asserting position and place in eighteenth 
– and nineteenth-century Switzerland. Violence in these studies is primarily a 
male preserve, but as van der Heijden reminds us, women too could use violence 
to protect, assert and advance status when necessary. Indeed, the study of women 
as perpetrators of violence has too often been overshadowed by, and relegated to 
a position of secondary importance, by the oft-cited fact that men make up the 
vast majority of homicide perpetrators and victims. Efforts to look beyond lethal 
violence reveal, however, a more  complex picture. As van der Heijden and other 
have demonstrated, at the lower levels of the criminal justice system women were 
often prominent among those accused of violent crime. Perhaps the most striking 
aspect of such research has been to highlight how little difference there often was 
between the character of female violence and that of their male counterparts.25 While 
men might predominate in the perpetration of acts of lethal violence, women also 
participated, in similar ways, in the practice of violence.
There is also broad agreement among historians that the relationship between 
honour and the practice of violence has changed or at least evolved over time, 
although there has been  considerably less agreement over the nature of that change. 
Spierenburg, for instance, believes that there has been a long-term shift in the 
character of violence – in particular a move from impulsive and ritual violence in 
23 Spierenburg (2008) ; Muchembled (2012) ; Shoemaker (2001) ; Walz (1992). Some, however, argue 
that this perspective endows the arbitrariness of interpersonal violence with too much of a social 
logic. See Wettmann-Jungblut (2003, p. 57).
24 See, for instance, Kiernan (1988) ; Muchembled (2012).
25 van der Heijden (2013). See also Warner et al. (2008) ; Kilday (2007) ; Dinges (1991) ; Eibach (2007).
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the late medieval period to a greater emphasis on instrumental and planned violence 
in the modern era. He also links this change to a broader and gradual ‘spiritualization 
of honour’ in Europe over the course of the early modern period whereby honour 
increasingly depended on an  individual’s sense of self-worth. It was no longer 
bestowed upon the individual by the wider  community.26
Others, while not denying that change occurred, have criticized key aspects of this 
position and, in particular, its portrayal of violence in medieval society as impulsive. 
A number of German historians, most notably Schwerhoff and Martin Dinges, have 
argued strongly that there was often much more to violent  confrontations than a 
simple impulsive reaction to external threat. Schwerhoff, for instance, argues 
that there was a strong element of ritual surrounding incidents of violence in late 
medieval and early modern Europe which served to  contain and  control the extent of 
violent activity and which reflected the ability of men to  control their emotions. This, 
he argues, is reflected in the fact there were often different stages in the escalation of 
 conflicts which allowed the participants to decide whether or not to participate in or 
withdraw from a dispute or gave third parties the opportunity to intervene.27
There was also often more to such  conflicts than simple impulsive reactions to 
provocative gestures and minor infringements. They could reflect long-standing and 
deep-rooted  conflicts within  communities. Schwerhoff argues that the line between 
questions of honour and material interests was often blurred. Many violent incidents 
were rooted in local  conflicts between individuals and families.28 The long-standing 
 conflicts which underlay many violent  confrontations and the ritualised nature of 
many violent encounters suggest that there was more to medieval and early modern 
violence than an impulsive reaction to a momentary questioning of individual 
honour.
Spierenburg, however, rejects these criticisms and claims that “ritual and 
impulsive violence are wholly  commensurable” and that pre-existing disputes are 
not incompatible with impulsive acts of violence. He is, indeed, highly critical 
of historians who have argued that the ritual elements in violent acts reveal a 
pronounced level of self- control. Spierenburg argues instead that there is no 
necessary inconsistency between the rituals which surround acts of violence in the 
middle ages and the categorization of such violence as impulsive or at least as more 
impulsive than in later periods. His argument is essentially that ritual practices are 
fixed and so deeply ingrained that there is relatively little need for calculation or 
planning : the ritual is carried out with limited reflection. Moreover, he argues that 
historians have  consistently failed to demonstrate the existence of a link between 
ritual and self- control in the middle ages.29
This does not, however, seem to imply for Spierenburg that there is no  connection 
between ritual and self- control, but rather that it simply does not apply to the same 
extent in the  context of violence among ordinary people. He allows, for instance, for 
the possibility of a  connection between ritual and self- control in his discussion of the 
elite duel. Here, the rituals surrounding the act reflect a propensity for self- control 
and an ability to  contain and express violence within clearly defined limits. Thus, for 
26 Spierenburg (2008, pp. 7-10).
27 Schwerhoff (2011, pp. 120-122) ; Walz (1992) ; Dinges (1994) ; Eriksson, Krug-Richter (2003).
28 See also Ruff (2008) ; Ludwig (2011) ; Mc Mahon (2013, chapter two).
29 Spierenburg (2008, p. 36, 2001, pp. 93-97).
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Spierenburg, the duel represents “a major innovation in violence” in that “the delay 
between the challenge and the actual fight promoted the restraint of emotions. It was 
a step away from outright impulsiveness in the direction of planned violence”.30
This raises a rather obvious question : if a time gap can indicate a degree of 
self- control in elite duels, which were undoubtedly subject to ritual practices, why 
not in more popular forms of violence ? Spierenburg, however, does not apply 
this reasoning to more popular forms of violence that also entailed a clear delay. 
For instance, in early modern Germany, the practice of Ausfordern aus dem Haus 
(Challenging out of the house or ‘house scorning’) required the challenger to visit 
his  opponent’s house and call him out to fight. In these cases, there could be a 
 considerable time difference between the original dispute and the challenge. Days 
could pass, which suggests planning (biding  one’s time until the moment was right 
to  confront  one’s opponent) or reflection (a struggle over whether to  confront  one’s 
opponent).31 Spierenburg regards such delays as less indicative of individual self- 
control than elite duels but provides no real evidence to support his position. Indeed, 
while Spierenburg criticises others for failing to establish a clear  connection between 
ritual and self- control, he does not provide clear evidence that ritual did not involve a 
 considerable level of self- control. Some of the evidence provided by Spierenburg, in 
fact, suggests a  considerable degree of calculation rather than a ritualized response 
with a relative lack of forethought. To take but one example, revenge killings in the 
medieval period were often carried out on the anniversary of the original homicide, 
which suggests a marked level of planning and calculation involved in the act.32 
Particularly when  compared to the rather uncontrolled violence, detailed by Cronin, 
among some members of the seventeenth-century elite.33
It is also impossible to assess whether or not ritual recurrently failed to inhibit 
violence, given that incidents where ritual may have succeeded in so doing are often 
not recorded in the criminal records.34 The evidence that does exist suggests that the 
intervention of third parties was  common and that many cases that appeared before 
the courts involved incidents where the  confrontation stopped short of physical 
violence. In the southern German town of Constance between 1430 and 1460 no less 
than 309 (53 per cent) out of a total of 582 registered violent  conflicts were merely 
threats with weapons, mostly so-called knife pulling (‘Messerzücken’) without any 
injuries.35 Higher homicide rates in the middle ages might reflect the greater failure 
rate of ritual to  contain violence (this again would be a suspect claim), but given the 
doubts that now surround the apparent changes in homicide rates this is a dubious 
proposition.
Patterns of violence in the present day, moreover, appear to be characterised by 
the very impulsivity that the civilising process thesis associates with the middle ages. 
In England between 1992 and 2003, for instance, 45.6 per cent of known homicides 
30 Spierenburg (2008, p. 73).
31 See Eibach (2008, pp. 59-61) ; Krug-Richter (2004) ; See also Spierenburg (2008, pp. 69-70).
32 Spierenburg (2008, p. 36).
33 Cronin (2013).
34 Spierenburg has argued that ritual ‘recurrently’ failed to  contain violence in the late middle ages 
(Spierenburg 2001, p. 96).
35 Schuster (2000a, pp. 71 & 95). See also Dean (2007, chapter nine).
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arose from “quarrel, revenge or loss of temper”.36 The evidence from central 
Europe also indicates that there may have been a gradual loosening of the rituals 
surrounding violence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which suggests 
that violence has probably become more, not less, impulsive.37 The notion of a shift 
towards more ‘instrumental’ violence in the modern era is also open to question. 
Indeed, the  contextual data that Spierenburg provides on homicide in fourteenth-
century England indicates that, in certain locations, homicides arising from burglary 
or robbery could account for “no fewer than 25 and 30 per cent” of cases.38 Such 
high levels of “instrumental ‘violence’”, no matter how violent or unplanned, do 
little to support the argument that modern homicide patterns are characterised by 
a greater resort to violence for immediate personal gain – especially given that in 
England, between 1992 and 2003, homicides “in furtherance of theft or gain” or 
more ‘instrumental’ violence accounted for only 7.25 per cent of cases.39
It is also often difficult to establish clear differences between the means used in 
present-day violence and the violence of some earlier periods. Even with the greater 
availability of firearms in the present day, gun-related homicide in many areas of 
Europe remains rare. In modern England, only 9 per cent of homicides between 
1992 and 2003 involved firearms while 16 per cent or nearly double involved hitting 
or kicking while the most  common method of killing was with a sharp instrument 
accounting for just under a third of all cases.40 The prominence of the knife in modern 
English homicide cases is, in fact, similar to practices detected in early modern 
Amsterdam.41 Curiously, experiences in both modern England and early modern 
Amsterdam  contrast with Italian cities in the late medieval period, where the use of 
knives as weapons by ordinary people was actually quite rare.42
There can be little doubt that evidence on patterns of violence in the present, 
coupled with questions over the quantitative data, raise serious problems for any 
thesis based on a study of interpersonal violence that posits a fundamental shift 
in the ‘affect  control’ of ordinary people between the middle ages and the present. 
Indeed, it is also worth reflecting on the value of homicide as a means of establishing 
a viable  comparative measure of the extent of ‘affect  control’ within different 
population groups. Does a higher homicide rate necessarily imply a lower level of 
‘affect  control’ ? For instance, does the fact that there are lower homicide rates in the 
thirteenth century than in the fourteenth century imply that fourteenth-century men 
were less able to  control themselves than their thirteenth-century forefathers ? Or 
to take a more modern example, does the fact that there were lower homicide rates 
in Finland in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth century necessarily imply 
that people who lived Finland in the latter century were less capable of  controlling 
36 Povey (2004, p. 16).
37 See Cottier, Raciti (2013) ; Eibach (2003, pp. 236-241). On the de-ritualization of violence as a result 
of  constant warfare, see Lorenz (2007).
38 Spierenburg (2008, p. 39).
39 Povey (2004, p. 16).
40 Ibid. (p. 11).
41 Spierenburg (2001, pp. 81-96).
42 See Dean (2007, pp. 169-70).
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their emotions than their predecessors in the nineteenth century ?43 Perhaps it does, 
but it would be a large claim to make based on such limited evidence and would 
marginalise other factors which could offer more  compelling reasons for such 
differences. It ultimately runs the risk of writing a history of  control which fails to 
fully acknowledge a history of  conflict.
There is also the danger of engaging in a circular argument, namely that we 
know there were low levels of ‘affect  control’ because there were high rates of 
homicide and there was a high rate of homicide because there was a low level of 
‘affect  control’ – thus we risk using the known to quantify the unknowable. It might, 
of course, be argued that there is  considerable corroborating evidence to support the 
idea that there was a lack of ‘affect  control’. This might be seen, for instance, in the 
original focus of the civilising process thesis on dining habits and bodily functions 
in the late middle ages which suggests that men and women inhabited a somewhat 
less  controlled world. This, however, raises a curious anomaly when applied to the 
history of interpersonal violence, namely the position of women. Why did women 
not demonstrate a similar propensity for lethal interpersonal violence in the public 
sphere, despite being subject to a similar lack of ‘affect  control’ ?
The fact that they did not would again indicate that the practice of violence 
was  controlled and limited. It was not primarily a product of lower levels of ‘affect 
 control’. In this sense, homicides rates reflect the  complex interplay of  conflict and 
 control and cannot be used as a simple or straightforward index of either. Ultimately, 
the study of practices of violence reveals  considerable similarities in the character of 
interpersonal violence across time and  cultures, and serves to undermine any simple 
narrative of a fundamental change or transformation in the behaviour of men and 
women over time.
MARGINALISATION
If the evidence for a transformation in the extent and character of violence in 
Europe is weak, what then of the broader place and position of interpersonal violence 
in European life from the middle ages to the present day ? For many historians, such 
a transformation is indisputable. Central to the civilising process thesis, in particular, 
is the view that there was a fundamental shift in the place of, and attitudes to, violence 
from the middle ages to the present, driven, in large measure, but not exclusively, 
by interrelated changes in attitudes among elite groups ; the trickle down of elite 
attitudes to violence to other social groups ; and by wider processes of urbanization 
and increasing state intervention.
From this perspective, interpersonal violence was central to European life in the 
middle ages and this was reflected in a widespread acquiescence in interpersonal 
violence among men of all social ranks. From the late fourteenth century to the 
mid-seventeenth century, there was, however, a gradual, if halting, process of 
criminalization which, developed in tandem with a wider process of urbanisation 
and the early stages of state formation. Initially, this process took account of older 
43 Lindström notes that “from the eighteenth century on the aggregated homicide rate in Finland 
 continued to increase up to the 1920s, when it reached a level of more than 8 killings per 100,000”. 
Lindström (2008, p. 45).
16 RICHARD MC MAHON, JOACHIM EIBACH AND RANDOLPH ROTH
or more ‘popular’  concepts of what  constituted legitimate action (often through the 
judicious use of the pardon) but ultimately it led to the  consistent prosecution of 
serious violent crime by the state. This process of criminalization was related to 
and reinforced by a series of developments such as the introduction of police forces 
and the emergence of formalised and structured sporting bodies which led to the 
increased marginalization of violence within European society in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Throughout this process, violence moved, it is argued, from 
the centre to the margins of the socio- cultural landscape of Europe, reflecting and 
reinforcing a greater desire to  control violence and increased sensitivity towards it.44
There are again problems with this narrative of a shift in interpersonal violence 
from the centre to the margins of European life. While men from all social groups 
could engage in violence in the late middle ages, we need to be careful in ascribing 
a central or necessarily dominant position to interpersonal violence in everyday life 
in medieval and early modern Europe. This would be to downplay the  considerable 
evidence that exists of the efforts made to  contain and  control violent activity.
There were certainly efforts made throughout the late medieval and early modern 
period to regulate and  control violence. The elaborate reconciliation ceremonies of 
the middle ages do not, for instance, suggest that there was a lack of sensitivity 
towards violence or a lack of desire to  control it – indeed, they seem to involve a 
clear recognition that a wrong had been perpetrated and that restitution was needed 
in order to prevent further action.45 In this sense, reconciliation reflects a clear desire 
to  control and  contain violence rather than simply acquiescence in the perpetration of 
violent activity. As Spierenburg has noted, private reconciliation was an “important 
tool of social  control”.46
Within many European cities, guilds could also take steps to ensure that their 
members did not step outside the bounds of acceptable behaviour. Guild statutes 
are full of demands to “avoid swearing and insults in pubs, not to bring weapons to 
 festivities, to pull knives, to kick down doors or to fight”.47 Violence, of course, could 
at times play a crucial role in the attempt to resolve  conflicts and could be resorted to 
in ways that have few, if any, modern-day equivalents in European society. Certain 
forms of violent behaviour were tolerated and could be regarded as legitimate, but 
only if the participants followed accepted rules and kept violence within certain 
limits. This suggests that violence could also be used, as Schwerhoff and others have 
argued, in a relatively planned and calculated way as a means of negotiating  conflict 
and keeping violence (not always successfully) within manageable limits.48 There 
is, in this sense, a difference between a society where the legitimate use of violence 
is more widely dispersed and resorted to by a variety of different actors and one in 
which violence is inevitable and the central means of dealing with  conflict. Indeed, 
44 Spierenburg (2008, chapters two and six).
45 Spierenburg (2008, chapter two).
46 Spierenburg (2008, p. 50).
47 Eibach (2008, p. 58). On the importance of guilds in  controlling violence in medieval London, see 
Hanawalt (1993).
48 See Schwerhoff (2004). Hannah Skoda has also noted an ambivalence at the heart of medieval at-
titudes to violence which at the same time recognised the use of violence to impose order, but also 
its potential for disorder. She argues, plausibly, that “violence was not accepted as inevitable or its 
presence straightforwardly  condoned”, Skoda (2013, p. 2). While violence could be  common and 
widely practiced, it was not “so socially integral as to be deemed acceptable”, Skoda (2013, p. 50).
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what is striking about violence in the late middle ages is the degree to which it was 
kept within certain bounds and limits and not allowed to play too disruptive a role 
in European life, long before the Enlightenment and the rise of the modern state. 
Violence might be allowed, but it was not allowed to disrupt the prevailing order.
Aside from the use of ritual to  contain and  control violence, the desire to limit violent 
 conflict can be seen most obviously in the fact that the primary evidence for violent 
activity in the late middle ages and early modern period  comes from sources that were 
dedicated to its  control, namely courts records. This suggests that at the very least there 
were alternative strategies available when it came to dealing with  conflict : violence 
and the law, while by no means mutually exclusive strategies, could  compete as a 
means of dealing with  conflict. Moreover, as the courts came increasingly to provide 
a viable forum for the resolution of disputes, ordinary people were more than willing 
to use them – indeed, the absence of overt or effective resistance to the prosecution 
of violent crime is a striking feature of the operation of the courts in many countries. 
The prosecution of violent activity through the court system, in fact, depended to a 
 considerable degree on the participation of ordinary people.49
The courts could be used to prosecute violence both in the public and private 
spheres.50 In some areas, it is clear that courts, along with  communal interventions, 
were crucial in  controlling problems such as domestic violence. As van der Heijden 
clearly demonstrates, neighbours helped to ensure that domestic violence did not 
disrupt urban life in early modern Holland.51 Indeed, the assumption that women 
in the early modern period were more vulnerable to, and more frequent victims of, 
domestic violence is at least open to question. As Julie Hardwick has argued, in the 
 context of early modern France, women often had as much, or at times even greater, 
protection against the more extreme forms of violence than their modern-day 
counterparts.52 In Germany and Switzerland, women were also active in pursuing 
cases of domestic violence through the courts.53
The participation of ordinary men and women in the prosecution of violent 
crime also cannot be explained by the trickle down of elite attitudes and manners. 
It reveals over time a  consistent desire on the part of ordinary people to prosecute 
various forms of violent activity and, in turn, to  control rather than acquiesce in the 
perpetration of violent acts.54 Even where the courts failed to secure  convictions, 
such failure should not necessarily be taken as evidence of a lack of  concern but may 
49 See Mc Mahon (2008). In a review of the cited book in this journal, Spierenburg states, rather bizarre-
ly, that the introduction tries to ‘revive’ the  concept, introduced by Lenman and Parker, of a judicial 
revolution. The introduction, in fact, provides a critique of the applicability of that  concept to early 
modern Europe and notes that a number of essays in the collection “serve to undermine” Lenman and 
 Parker’s thesis. Spierenburg (2010).
50 Dinges (2004).
51 van der Heijden (2013).
52 In her discussion of domestic violence in early modern France, Hardwick argues that “although a 
seventeenth-century woman was legally subject to her  husband’s discipline, wives themselves as 
well as individuals and institutions in local  communities publicly negotiated the parameters of that 
discipline. A twentieth-century woman living in a  community that valorized romantic,  companionate, 
and privatized ideals of marriage was, by  contrast, isolated and wary of public acknowledgment of 
her status as a battered wife.” Hardwick (2006, p. 1).
53 Schmidt (1998).
54 See Mc Mahon (2008).
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rather simply imply a different means of dealing with  conflict. To draw a parallel 
with infanticide cases, the high acquittal rate for this offence in parts of eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century Britain does not necessarily mean that juries acquiesced in 
the killing of new-born babies or even that they thought such behaviour excusable 
or legitimate but rather may, as Richard Ireland has argued in the  context of 
nineteenth-century Wales, suggest that they thought there were alternate means of 
dealing with offenders rather than imposing the full rigours of the law.55 Similarly, 
it may be that the importance of repairing social relations within  communities 
through reconciliation and  compensation took precedence in some respects over the 
full imposition of a criminal sanction which might aggravate rather than resolve a 
 conflict.56 Indeed, such practices are, at least in the  context of non-lethal violence, by 
no means unheard of in the present day.
The notion, central to the civilising process thesis, that urbanization and the greater 
intervention of the state are necessary pre- conditions for low or declining homicides 
rates is also open to question. Recent studies have revealed that rural areas in which 
the state did not take on an overt and interventionist role were not necessarily places 
where violence played a central part in social and  cultural life. In the early modern 
Isle of Man, violence was not regarded as a serious problem and the incidence of 
violence appears quite low. Yet, the island lacked any substantial urban centre, it was 
economically underdeveloped and was largely cut off from the encroachment of the 
centralising state. Ordinary people on the island also had little by way of elite example 
to draw on.57 Julius Ruff has also demonstrated that in rural areas of eighteenth-century 
France, where the courts played a marginal role in the  control of everyday violence 
and where the criminal justice system in general was relatively weak, homicide rates 
were as low as 0.72 per 100,000.58 Dag Lindström, although he charts a long-term 
decline in homicide in Sweden, highlights the fact that homicide rates were often quite 
low in some of the more remote, rural and economically isolated areas of Northern 
Sweden in the sixteenth century and were, if anything,  comparable to rates found in the 
present day.59 Peter King has also demonstrated that homicide rates were often higher 
in urban than rural areas of England and Wales in the nineteenth century and that any 
clear link between urbanization and declining homicide rates is highly problematic.60 
Evidence from nineteenth-century Ireland also suggests that rural, economically 
under-developed regions often had relatively low rates of homicide.61 On the other 
hand, in the court records of late medieval towns we find relatively high homicide 
rates in spite of urbanisation, differentiation of social roles and the early stages of state 
formation. Such evidence calls into question any notion of a fundamental difference in 
55 Ireland (1997).
56 In many cases of domestic abuse, for instance, the local or ecclesiastical courts served as mediators 
in marital  conflict and were used primarily to remind violent or drunken husbands of their duties. For 
Catholic Bavaria, see Beck (1992) ; for Lutheran Frankfurt, see Eibach (2007).
57 Sharpe (2008, pp. 131-32).
58 Ruff, (2008, p. 37). This rate is based on prosecutions but even if the rate was five times higher it 
would not be wholly out of line with rates in the present day – particularly if we allow for the impact 
of improvements in medical care.
59 Lindström (2008, p. 54).
60 King (2010).
61 Mc Mahon (2013).
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the rate of lethal interpersonal violence in rural societies with relatively low levels of 
state intervention and those which have more elaborate state structures.
The argument here is that low homicide rates do not depend on urbanization, 
overt state intervention or  consistent application of the criminal law, or more 
specifically the general criminalization of violence, but rather are rooted ultimately 
in the willingness and ability of  communities, when faced with  conflicts, to  contain 
and  control them both outside and inside the available criminal justice apparatus. 
This does not mean that the presence of a criminal justice system is insignificant 
(the evidence suggests non-state societies produce higher levels of interpersonal 
violence) but rather that a punitive, top down imposition of the criminal law is not 
a necessary precondition for low rates of homicide. Indeed, the available evidence, 
from throughout Europe, suggests that the  control of violence was due to the fact that 
ordinary people were often enthusiastic participants in the courts and were willing, 
more generally, to participate in the  control of violent activity through a variety of 
strategies for the negotiation of  conflict. There is ultimately a clear  continuity in the 
desire to  control and  contain interpersonal violence over time.
Of course, reactions to violence took different forms at different times and in 
different places and the ability to deal with violent  conflict depended always on the 
resources available and the related priorities of those involved. In this sense, the 
history of violence in modern Europe might be best understood less as involving a 
move in violent activity from the centre to the periphery of social and  cultural life 
but may more profitably be understood as reflecting ‘shifting degrees of marginality’ 
in violent action which, depending on circumstances, might see violence move 
either closer to or further away from the centre of everyday life. It should be the 
task of the historian to map how and why these changes occur across time and space 
without imposing fixed distinctions between ‘civilized’ and ‘less civilized’ societies 
or between the ‘pre-modern’ and the ‘modern’.62
There is, of course, one area where change is most obvious and profound, namely 
the profile of the participants in violent activity. The evidence from the late medieval 
period indicates that men from all social ranks participated in violent activity (albeit 
with limited interaction across social boundaries).63 Urban elites in central Europe, for 
instance, were regularly accused of violent crime and the exercise of political power 
was by no means inconsistent with the resort to acts of often serious interpersonal 
violence.64 Indeed, members of the urban elite were, if anything, overrepresented 
among the perpetrators of violence in the surviving sources for late medieval central 
Europe. There was also little that was distinctive about elite violence as it tended to 
follow established rituals of violence prevalent in the wider  culture.65
This situation was to change gradually over the course of the early modern 
period. Elites increasingly withdrew from participation in a shared form of violence 
and when they did engage in violent activity it was, by the nineteenth century, largely 
62 For a framework for tracing the causes of fluctuations in homicide rates over time, see Roth (2009). 
See also Mc Mahon (2013).
63 Dean notes that “violence [in late medieval Italy] rarely ascended or descended the social scale”. 
Violence across ‘status boundaries’ tended to follow particular and often predictable patterns : “the 
violence of husband against wife, of men against prostitutes, of men or women against local officials 
or agents (…)” Dean (2007, p. 171).
64 For Zurich, see Burghartz (1990) and for Constance, see Schuster (2000b).
65 Schwerhoff (2013). 
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restricted to the exclusive and distinctive practice of duelling. The duel was, as 
Schwerhoff argues, increasingly a means of imposing social distinctions – it allowed 
for the negotiation of  conflicts and the assertion of status within the elite while also 
allowing them to distance themselves from the violent practices of the masses (even 
if the elite duel, as Cronin clearly demonstrates, could often descend to the level of 
a fairly brutal  contest).66
Members of the emerging middle classes in the cities of central Europe also 
began to distance themselves from the general practices of violence in the eighteenth 
century. There was, for instance, a marked change in the social  composition of 
offenders before the urban courts of central Europe over the course of the early 
modern period.67 Cottier and Raciti also note that Swiss cities saw a marked change 
in the practices of violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. They point to 
the gradual withdrawal of middle class participants in violence, the loosening of 
rituals of honour and the development of new and distinctive forms of violence.68
From the eighteenth century onwards, ritualised violence seemed to lose its 
force as a  common or shared means of  communication. Its ability to act as a shared 
language weakened as social and  cultural divisions became increasingly marked 
over the course of the early modern period. The middle classes, in particular, became 
reluctant to be involved in the game of violence – preferring the new and more 
refined sociability of the coffee house to the rough rituals of the tavern.69 This change 
was, moreover, not simply a central European phenomenon. In Ireland too there is 
a sense that the emerging middle classes increasingly distanced themselves from 
the violent practices associated with the duel in the early nineteenth century and 
the more rambunctious practices of the eighteenth century.70 In eighteenth-century 
England, there is evidence of a rejection of older  conceptions of male honour 
among the middle classes and a greater reluctance to engage in violent activity.71 
This rejection of violence by an emerging middle class persists to the present day. 
Perpetrators of lethal violence are today drawn predominantly from the ranks of the 
unemployed and marginalised.72
Yet we need again to be careful not to read these developments as simply a 
narrative of change with violence moving from the centre to the margins of European 
life. In Italy, the birth place of the duel, the centrality of interpersonal violence in 
late medieval elite  culture can, for instance, be questioned. Trevor Dean highlights 
how most duels in late medieval Italy either failed to take place or came to a speedy 
 conclusion after “one or two bloody blows”. A death arising from a duel was rare and 
tended to occur “only by accident”.73 Studies of Renaissance Italy also suggest that, 
amongst the elite at least, violence was often a last resort rather than a  common or 
central practice and that ‘verbal duelling’ was often a legitimate and respected means 
66 Schwerhoff (2013) ; Cronin (2013).
67 Eibach (2009, pp. 201-204).
68 Cottier, Raciti (2013).
69 Eibach (2003, pp. 241-252).
70 Kelly (1995).
71 Shoemaker (2001).
72 Brookman (2005, p. 39).
73 Dean (2007, p. 180).
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of dealing with  conflict.74 There was an upsurge in the practice of duelling in Italy in 
the early sixteenth century, but this was followed by a rapid decline in the latter half of 
the century. Indeed, a survey of the history of the duel generally reveals the failure of 
violence to take on a central role in the negotiation of  conflict amongst the European 
elite. Italy, Germany, the Dutch Republic, Spain, Scandinavia and Switzerland were, 
at best, lukewarm adherents to the practice of duelling in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries and in some areas the duel did not take hold at all. France did embrace the 
duel in the seventeenth century but it was, in the words of one historian, an “exception” 
and the nature of violence among the French elite is wholly outside the general patterns 
of violence found over the long term in European life.75 Even here, efforts were made 
to ensure that the duel did not pose too great a threat or became too central to life at 
court. The duel might be tolerated or even indulged at certain courts but it is less clear 
that it was central to the lives of the elite throughout Europe. Moreover, its practice and 
meaning changed  considerably over the centuries.76
We need to be careful also not to see the eighteenth century as a moment when 
the elite and middle classes abandoned the use and practice of violence. The duel 
re-emerged in Germany, for instance, in the late nineteenth century with circa 8,000 
students duels reported annually in the 1890s, while in France there were, on average, 
300 duels reported every year in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.77 Moreover, as 
Cottier and Raciti skilfully demonstrate, although the middle classes largely withdrew 
from forms of sociable violence or honour  contests, violence often re-emerged in new 
forms of intimate and fatal violence in the respectable cities of central Europe in the 
early years of the twentieth century.78 There is little evidence also to suggest that the 
middle classes have withdrawn from the practice of domestic violence. This does not 
mean that the development of  cultures of refinement among the middle classes and 
elite are not important or influential in the history of interpersonal violence. Those 
 cultures played a part in serving to inhibit and  control public acts of violence among 
the middle classes of Europe, particularly from the eighteenth century onwards. These 
developments point to real shifts in attitudes to and practices of violence. They also, 
however, reflected and were products of a  consistent desire to ensure that interpersonal 
violence did not become a dominant force in European life – a desire which was 
expressed over time in a variety of often very diverse ways.
MAKING SENSE OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE IN EUROPE 
Patterns of interpersonal violence over time and space do not fit neatly within the 
framework of an over-arching theory such as that offered by the civilising process 
thesis. The extent of lethal interpersonal violence in the medieval and early modern 
periods does not support a neat narrative of decline but rather one of fluctuation and 
variation across time and space. Any fundamental claim to a less violent present, 
however pretty it is to think so, is undermined by a  consideration of the impact 
74 Weinstein (1994).
75 Muchembled (2012).
76 Ludwig, Krug-Richter, Schwerhoff (2012).
77 See Carroll (2007, pp. 31-32) ; see also Frevert (1995).
78 Cottier, Raciti (2013).
22 RICHARD MC MAHON, JOACHIM EIBACH AND RANDOLPH ROTH
of medical interventions on homicide rates, the difficulty of establishing any clear 
relationship between lethal and non-lethal violence and the difficulties inherent in 
the use of the available source material.
There have, of course, been changes, variations and shifts in practice. This 
can be seen in the withdrawal of elites from some shared forms of violent activity 
and eventually from the practice of duelling and the emergence of a middle class 
hostility towards particular forms of interpersonal violence. The means used to 
 control violence also evolved over time, reflecting innovations in the courts and 
legal practice as well as new codes of behaviour – particularly from the eighteenth 
century onwards. These developments were significant in shaping the history of 
interpersonal violence but they should not be mistaken for a wider civilising process 
or be seen as a product of greater levels of ‘affect  control’, nor should they blind 
us to the underlying  continuities which have shaped, and  continue to shape, human 
behaviour over the span of centuries. Such  continuities include the predominance 
of men as perpetrators of lethal violence, the persistence of violence as one means 
(among others) of defending, asserting or advancing personal status and the attempts, 
present in all social groups and  consistent throughout this period, to ensure that 
violence was limited and  controlled.
The task facing historians of violence is now to map the shifts in interpersonal 
violence over time and trace how it moved closer to and, at times, further away 
from the centre of European life over the centuries without imposing overly neat 
distinctions between historical periods. There also needs to be a transnational focus 
to future research. Violence cannot be fully understood within the  confines of 
national or regional history, rather we need to explore how the flow and movement of 
people and ideas across time and space shaped and re-shaped the extent, nature and 
character of violent activity. We also need to look beyond the boundaries of Europe 
to draw on the experiences and attitudes that prevail beyond its borders. Historians 
of violence would also benefit by engaging further with insights from outside the 
discipline, particularly those offered by psychology and the biological sciences. In 
doing so, historians should recognise the cross- cultural significance of key forms of 
social interaction and practice without forcing the  complexity of human behaviour 
into a framework which claims access to knowledge beyond the shaping hand of 
 culture.79 By adopting a variety of perspectives and embracing new approaches, we 












79 For a useful approach, see Shryock, Smail (2011).
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